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Love occurs in context, yet the dominant theories of how couples divide up 
housework model the interactions between two adults as if they occurred 
in a social cocoon. For example, bargaining or social exchange theories fo-
cused on the power derived from paid work and predicted women’s in-
creasing employment would lead to men performing more domestic tasks.1 
However, an increase in men’s domestic share during the past decades stems 
primarily from the dramatic decline in women’s housework hours, not 
substantial increases in men’s.2 The persistence of the gendered division of 
housework regardless of a woman’s employment supports the gender per-
spective that our daily activities reflect and reinforce normative expectations 
of masculine and feminine behavior (West and Zimmerman 1987). These 
normative expectations vary across social classes or ethnic groups, as well 
as across countries, reflecting gender regimes (Connell 1987) or cultures 
(Pfau-Effinger 1998). Norms also evolve over time, albeit more slowly and 
less spectacularly than we had first anticipated. In sum, how couples might 
divide paid and unpaid labor in the household varies across class, ethnic, 
temporal, and country contexts.
Only recently, however, have researchers begun to explore how couples’ 
sharing of housework varies within its sociopolitical as well as temporal 
contexts. This research has yielded somewhat conflicting evidence, in part 
because theory development linking context with individual behavior lags 
behind the available international data. Most analyses to date have focused 
on policy effects on women’s equality in the public spheres such as educa-
tion, employment, or political representation (Baxter 1997; Fuwa 2004). 
Equally important and intertwined with equality in the public sphere is 
whether policies reinforce women’s normative responsibility for the private 
sphere. In this chapter I outline how a broad range of policies influences 
women’s access to paid work as well as their continued responsibility for 
unpaid domestic activities, illustrated with examples from Australia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. These three countries are based in 
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British common law and share a liberal political ideology vis-à-vis reliance 
on the market over state provision of welfare, similarities that would lead 
us to expect common policy effects on the gendered division of labor across 
them. When comparing specific policies, however, the countries vary more 
in the degree to which the state shapes gender equality, so that we might find 
greater variation in how housework is divided within and across couples.
housework in context
Researchers frequently model the division of housework using time avail-
ability for housework measured with paid work hours and/or relative re-
sources measured with absolute or relative wages of the partners. Both ap-
proaches predict that women’s increasing labor force participation should 
have led to a revolution in women’s and men’s domestic roles, a revolution 
Hochschild (1989) deemed “stalled.” Regardless of employment or earn-
ings, U.S. women increase their housework hours when they move in with a 
man, whereas men decrease their hours when they move in with a woman.3 
The earliest comparative work reported little cross-country variation in ei-
ther the gendered division of housework or the effects of relative resources 
or time availability on altering this division.4 Despite this lack of significant 
variation, Baxter (1997) concluded any gains in gender equality in the home 
would result from women’s greater access to individual resources.
Breen and Cooke (2005) elaborate on this bargaining perspective using 
game theory to highlight the importance of alternatives to a relationship 
when deriving relative power in household negotiations. Only when women 
have economic resources sufficient to ensure their well-being outside of the 
relationship might they credibly threaten to leave households in which men 
refuse to participate in housework—a threat that increases their relative 
bargaining power. Under the normative gendered division of labor, Breen 
and Cooke (2005) argue, most men assume the average woman in their 
pool of possible partners has neither the inclination nor resources to leave. 
Consequently, an individual woman’s relative employment hours or earn-
ings predict only minimal increases in men’s housework. What is necessary 
before observing greater equality is that the proportion of economically au-
tonomous women must be sufficiently high to change men’s beliefs about 
what a partner would expect in the domestic sphere, and men must be will-
ing to act on those beliefs to maintain the relationship.
Some recent evidence supports the argument by Breen and Cooke 
(2005). Fuwa (2004) compared couples’ sharing of domestic responsibili-
ties in 22 industrial and transitional economies, controlling for aggregate 
country equality differences with the United Nations’ gender empowerment 
measure (GEM). The GEM includes the percentage of parliamentary seats 
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held by women; the percentage of women in administrative, managerial, and 
professional or technical positions; and women’s share of earnings income. 
Fuwa (2004) found time availability and gender ideology effects stronger 
or weaker for women in more versus less egalitarian countries, respectively, 
supporting that greater overall equality enhances the impact of individual 
resources on the division of housework. Hook (2006), using time diary data 
from 20 countries over several decades and controlling for the percentage 
of married women employed, women’s work hours, public child care slots 
for infants, and weeks of parental leave, found that men over time had in-
creased their total domestic hours (household tasks and child care) by about 
6 hours per week. Within this trend, a country’s greater aggregate female 
employment rate predicted men’s greater time in domestic tasks regardless 
of his partner’s actual employment.5 So we are accruing empirical evidence 
of linkages among policy, women’s employment, and how housework is 
divided up in the home.
The role of the state in shaping the gendered division of labor has grown 
as a subject of theoretical as well as empirical interest, in part following the 
growth in theories of the welfare state. Mainstream welfare state theories 
focus on worker–citizens, a definition that excludes women in their roles as 
dependent wives or mothers (Pateman 1988). Jane Lewis (1992) suggests, 
instead, examining women’s position in the labor market, social security, 
and tax systems to classify countries as ranging from “weak” to “strong” 
male breadwinner states by the extent to which policy relies on women’s 
responsibility for unpaid care work. Ann Orloff (1993) applies a gender 
lens to expand dimensions within Esping-Andersen’s (1990) widely cited 
welfare regime typology6 to include how the state affects women’s access to 
paid work, as well as her ability to establish an autonomous household. The 
approaches by Lewis (1992) and Orloff (1993) suggest that a much broader 
range of policies affects gender relations inside and outside the home than 
has been explored in cross-national analyses of housework to date.
policy effects on the gendered division of labor
Paid or Unpaid Work?
The three dimensions of policy effects on gender relations—reinforcement 
of women’s domestic roles, access to paid work, and ability to form au-
tonomous households—overlap and result in competing effects on women’s 
range of choices.7,8 For example, education and training systems can pre-
pare women to pursue careers similar to those of men, with recent evidence 
revealing women’s educational attainment beginning to equal or exceed 
men’s (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 
2004). Yet, the structure of public education often inhibits women’s ability 
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to participate in the labor force. Compulsory schooling does not start until 
children reach the age of 6 or 7 years, so without parental leaves, public pro-
vision of preprimary care, or child care tax credits, new mothers are more 
likely to exit employment upon childbirth. At the same time, extensive paid 
maternity leaves increase the incentive to interrupt employment for longer 
periods of time, particularly among low-skilled women (Jaumotte 2003). In 
some public educational systems, school hours vary, students are sent home 
for lunch, or school schedules include long or frequent vacations.9 These 
policies encourage part-time employment to accommodate school schedules 
that are out of sync with standard employment schedules, with women, not 
men, historically adjusting their paid work to family demands. Even well-
paid part-time employment reduces accrued work experience, increasing the 
gender wage gap. When conflict between work and family persists, the gender 
wage gap leads to couples making the “rational” decision that the woman 
should be the one to exit employment, perpetuating one basis of that gap.
Labor laws directly affect women’s access to paid work and the wages 
she might earn. In most industrialized countries, the first labor regulations re-
stricted women’s access to employment, often in hopes of improving working 
conditions for men and the working class more generally.10 These restrictions 
resulted in occupational segregation and gender wage differentials increasing 
late in the 19th century while married female employment rates plummeted 
among the new, white middle class. Pushed by second-wave feminists dur-
ing the 1960s and ’70s, industrial societies subsequently passed equal pay, 
antidiscrimination, or affirmative action policies supporting greater equality 
in women’s economic roles. This legislation painted over, but did not funda-
mentally restructure, the gendered foundations, so aggregate levels of gender 
employment inequality persist in different ways across countries.
Tax provisions also affect women’s access to paid work. High marginal 
tax rates, where a second earner’s income gets taxed at a higher percent-
age, discourage female employment among couples—an effect that becomes 
more acute under progressive tax systems as household earnings increase. 
Tax credits for dependent spouses also discourage married women’s employ-
ment, more markedly among higher earners if calculated as a percentage 
of income, or among lower income families if a lump-sum amount is suf-
ficiently high to make available female employment a less desirable option. 
Similarly, family allowances discourage employment among the least-skilled 
women, particularly in countries where child care is limited or expensive. 
The employment disincentive becomes more extreme when family allow-
ances or other transfers are means tested and cease abruptly when earnings 
exceed some modest threshold, leading to a poverty trap and reliance on 
state transfers.
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To achieve gender equality, education, labor, and tax policy must sup-
port women’s access to paid work on all dimensions simultaneously; support 
for only one or two aspects leads to some element of a gendered division 
of labor being perpetuated. For example, high relative wages but extensive 
female part-time employment reduces women’s accrued experience relative 
to men’s. High relative wages coupled with tax policies supporting married 
male breadwinner families might encourage growth in nonmarital house-
holds so that dual-earner couples can reap the gains from the market with-
out incurring government penalties. Good employment prospects but little 
financial support for child care exacerbates the tension between family and 
work, and class differences among women as well. Thus, gender equality 
remains elusive within a patchwork of competing policy effects on women’s 
choice between paid and unpaid labor.
Economic Alternatives to a Relationship
The better partnered women’s options in lieu of a coresidential relation-
ship, the greater her bargaining power within a relationship when negotiat-
ing housework with her partner. Across industrialized countries, however, 
female-headed households are worse off than male-headed households, and 
are at greater risk of poverty in large part because of women’s inferior ac-
cess to paid work. However, transfers from the state can close the gender 
earnings gap across different household types.11 These include tax credits 
for lower income earners, child care credits, family allowances, housing ben-
efits, or social transfers not tied to employment. Such provisions enhance 
women’s—or at least mothers’—economic alternatives; but, as noted earlier, 
they discourage employment when they provide income unrelated to paid 
work. The availability of transfers, however, minimizes class differences 
among women and strengthens lower income women’s relative resources 
within the family, because they provide access to income that otherwise 
might not be available.12 This enhances a woman’s bargaining power when 
couples negotiate housework.
Rules for entitlement to work-related contributory benefits such as 
unemployment or pensions also influence women’s access to resources. In 
some countries, a woman’s entitlement is linked to her husband’s contribu-
tions rather than her own, with women losing access to these benefits upon 
divorce. A more common problem is that employed women pay insurance 
contributions as individuals, but the household is used as the basis for ben-
efit entitlement. As a result, a woman who loses her job might not have 
access to her unemployment benefits when her partner’s earnings maintain 
the household income above the required threshold. In keeping current with 
changing family demographics, many countries apply the household test to 
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cohabiting as well as legally married couples, although in some countries, 
such as Australia, only heterosexual couples fall under these rules.
Laws governing the division of marital assets and private postmarital 
payments also shape women’s ability to establish their own households. Di-
vorce law changes during the 1960s and ’70s were heralded as an advance 
for women’s right to leave unhappy marriages. Yet these laws also limited 
women’s right to spousal support, frequently expecting a woman to be eco-
nomically independent, regardless of whether she had been employed during 
the marriage. Child support payments can ease financial pressures when 
mothers establish their own households, but the amount of support and/
or the likelihood a mother receives it remain low even in countries such as 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, where central govern-
ment took control over award levels or collection.13 Because these laws and 
provisions affect women’s postrelationship economic situation, they alter 
her relative power within the relationship and influence the negotiated divi-
sion of housework.
Detailing the myriad of policy effects on gender relations highlights a 
key problem when comparing the division of housework across countries: 
Statistically, it is impossible to control for all of these effects. We quickly 
run out of country degrees of freedom in the hierarchical linear models in-
creasingly favored for conducting such multinational comparisons. An al-
ternative approach used here is to combine comparative and quantitative 
analytic methods. The comparative method is used to select countries that 
are similar on key dimensions, and to detail their historical and current 
policy differences, with quantitative individual-level analyses subsequently 
used to explore whether the pattern of aggregate variation yields differences 
observed at the individual level. Together, the different approaches advance 
our understanding of how context shapes couples’ private lives.
contrasting cases:  australia, united kingdom, 
and the united states
Esping-Andersen (1990) categorizes liberal regimes as those countries of 
British political heritage where an ideology of market capitalism dominates 
over state welfare provision.14 Consequently, the welfare state in these coun-
tries is less developed than in other regime types, with a greater expectation 
of individual responsibility for one’s well-being across the life course. Mod-
est, means-tested cash transfers are more common than government provi-
sion of services. Given the presumed minimal state reinforcement of hierar-
chies, women should have greater equality in these countries compared with 
the corporatist–conservative regimes found on the European continent that 
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reinforce gender hierarchies, but perhaps less than in social–democratic or 
former socialist countries actively encouraging education and employment 
equality, and assuming greater state responsibility for child care. A broad 
categorization of liberalism, however, overlooks the influence other institu-
tional actors have in setting and reshaping the state foundation of equality.
Australia
The powerful Australian trade union movement achieved men’s preferential 
employment access with the 1907 Harvester Judgement of the Common-
wealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court. This ruling established a family 
wage supporting a man, his dependent wife, and three children, regardless of 
an employer’s capacity to pay. Women’s access to employment was restricted 
with the 1912 court ruling distinguishing between men’s and women’s work, 
leading to greater occupational segregation. The gender wage gap became 
law with a 1919 ruling setting the female wage to approximately half the 
male wage. During the 1920s, feminists lobbied for equal pay and mother-
hood endowments to remove the pretext of a family wage, given that 60 
percent of working men were single with no dependents. Payment of the 
family wage was defended, however, on the grounds that single men had to 
purchase services provided to married men gratuitously, including house-
work (Lake 1993).
Beginning in the late 1960s, Australia passed a series of equal pay and 
comparable worth statutes that narrowed the gender wage gap compared 
with other countries, although these statutes did not rectify the occupa-
tional segregation.15 Australian government support for gender equality 
increased a bit further during the 1970s and ’80s, with the introduction of 
commonwealth funding for long-day child care places, 52 weeks of unpaid 
maternity leave, and equal rights in child custody and property settlements 
after divorce. Affirmative action became law in 1986, but penalties for non-
compliance remain negligible and the law applies only to private sector busi-
nesses with 100 or more employees, or less than 10 percent of Australian 
employers. Single mothers’ high reliance on government transfers led to the 
1988 Child Support Registration and Collection Act, which established a 
new agency that would calculate child support awards and collect support 
payments. For similar reasons, the United States, in 1974,16 and the UK, 
in 1990, passed similar laws. Despite these efforts, less than three quarters 
of the Australian child support due is actually collected (Baker 2001), with 
similar lackluster results in the United Kingdom and the United States.17 As 
of the mid 1990s, about half of Australian single mothers lived in poverty, 
comparable with the proportion in the United Kingdom, but much less than 
in the United States. These high poverty rates are driven in large part by 
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single parents who are outside the labor force. Among nonemployed single 
parents, 42% in Australia, 65% in the United Kingdom, and more than 
93% in the United States live in poverty (Forster and Pearson 2000).
A conservative coalition took control of the Commonwealth govern-
ment during the 1990s, implementing more liberal market policies eroding 
the male wage while simultaneously reinforcing women’s domestic responsi-
bility. The 1996 Workplace Relations Act introduced family caregiver leave 
and increased incentives for women to work part-time to balance employ-
ment and family demands better. The Family Support Reform of 2000 in-
troduced Child Care Benefit to provide cash assistance to families rather 
than continued expansion of public child care, along with a two-part means-
tested allowance comprised of a general allowance and an additional allow-
ance for households with a single breadwinner. In perhaps one of the more 
stark modern examples of reinforcing women’s place in the home, a Baby 
Bonus was introduced in 2002 that offers a refundable tax offset of up to 
$2500 annually for up to 5 years if one parent reduces or exits employment 
upon the birth of the first child.
So despite the gender wage gains from the 1970s resulting in one of the 
narrowest current gender wage gaps for full-time workers at 89 percent (al-
though much larger when including part-time workers), most Australian poli-
cies reinforce a gendered division of labor. In addition, more young Australian 
women than men go on to university, but more women than men also fail to 
complete secondary schooling. The employment gap between women and men 
is 20 percentage points, and among Australian women who are employed, one 
third work part-time with lower wages and less access to benefits.18
United Kingdom
British policy reinforces separate spheres through continued reliance on 
women’s unpaid work in the home. William Beveridge (1942), architect of 
the modern British welfare state, premised a gendered system, because “. . . 
the great majority of married women must be regarded as occupied on work 
which is vital though unpaid, without which their husbands could not do 
their paid work and without which the nation could not continue” (p. 50). 
This premise led to a series of restrictions on married women’s independent 
access to work-related contributory benefits such as unemployment or pen-
sions, leading many women to opt out of making any contributions. After 
the insurance system changed in 1977 to require full contributions, the low-
paid, part-time work in which women dominate often fell below the Lower 
Earnings Limit, so that many women still remained uncovered by contribu-
tory insurance.19
Britain’s affiliation with the European Union (EU) advanced gender 
equality further than would have likely occurred otherwise. In anticipation of 
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joining the EU, Britain passed the Equal Pay Act of 1970 to be compliant with 
provisions under the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The 1975 Sex Discrimination Act 
established the Equal Opportunities Commission, which subsequently took 
cases to the European Court to put pressure on the national government to 
comply with gender equality directives. For example, the 1975 Employment 
Protection Act granted maternity leave before and after birth, some of which 
was paid at 90 percent of prior wages, and some of which was paid at the flat 
sickness benefit rate. These maternity leave provisions are the most generous 
among the three countries discussed here, but until the 1990s, qualification 
parameters meant that only a fraction of British women were eligible. EU 
pressure led to improvements in these provisions to cover more women, in-
cluding rulings on Parental Leave (1984), Pregnancy (1990), and Working 
Time and Part-time Work (2000) (Walby 2001).
New Labour came into power in 1997 and introduced a series of New 
Deals emphasizing labor activation, although not necessarily away from a 
male breadwinner model. Some argue the Working Families Tax Credit dis-
courages employment of second earners, thus reinforcing a male breadwin-
ner model (Bennett 2002; Walby 2001). New Labour introduced a child care 
tax credit for working families for up to 70 percent of actual expenses and 
has expanded public preprimary child care, but only with part-time slots of 
limited help to mothers desiring full-time work. This reflects New Labour’s 
focus on women’s part-time employment as the key work–family reconcili-
ation strategy. Consequently, the gender employment gap at 14 percentage 
points is somewhat smaller in Britain than in Australia, but a similar propor-
tion of employed women work part-time. Lacking Australia’s comparable 
worth policies, however, the British gender wage gap is among the largest 
across industrialized countries, with British women who work full-time earn-
ing on average just 75 percent of what British men earn (OECD 2002).
The United States
Ideological adherence to liberal tenets delayed and blunted development of 
a U.S. welfare state; decentralized trade unionism coupled with the nip and 
tuck of litigation reduced the degree to which gender inequalities became 
embedded within the state. U.S. employers effectively exploited the separa-
tion of powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of gov-
ernment to overturn early trade union legislative gains in the courts. So in 
contrast to Australian and British trade union movements, the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) severed itself from what it considered a pater-
nalist state, choosing instead to fight for employee benefits via traditional 
market-based actions. This decision led to the development of corporate 
rather than state welfare programs. The AFL also opposed lobbying for 
family wages on grounds that it would undercut union power, and it took 
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the formal stance of gender equality in employment at the national level 
while turning a blind eye to local-level discrimination.20 Among the three 
countries, the United States was the last to pass protective legislation that 
limited women’s access to employment opportunities.
After World War II, U.S. women’s equal access to paid work arose as a civil 
rights issue, with passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, making 
discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, sex unlawful in all aspects of employ-
ment and training in firms of 25 or more employees. The Act also established 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to enforce antidis-
crimination laws, although the Commission was deemed a “toothless tiger” 
until 1972, when Congress gave it litigation enforcement authority. With this 
authority, the EEOC could file lawsuits not just on specific complaints against 
employers, unions, and employment agencies, but also on what the Commis-
sion viewed as patterns of discrimination. EEOC efforts through the courts 
and political lobbying led to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, re-
quiring employers with disability policies to include pregnancy, and the 1980 
Guidelines on Sexual Harassment ruling that employment decisions condi-
tional upon sexual favors or hostile employment environments created by un-
welcome sexual conduct were prohibited under Title VII. Successful litigation 
of complaints brings award of damages. For example, in a recently settled 
case, a 17-year-old female kitchen helper charged she had been subjected to 
sexual harassment for 3 months despite complaints to managers. She received 
$12,000 in back pay and another $168,000 in compensatory damages.21
U.S. policy support within the home remains the least generous of all 
industrialized countries. At no point did the United States introduce univer-
sal family allowances as in other countries. Instead, working persons receive 
tax deductions based on number of children, a policy expanded in the mid 
1970s to include additional tax credits for low-earning families, and a child 
care tax credit for 20% to 35% of actual expenses up to a set maximum, 
compared with the 70% now covered under British provisions. Although 
some U.S. women had access to maternity leave as part of a corporate dis-
ability program, parental leave only became a right with the 1993 Family 
and Medical Leave Act, which allows up to 12 weeks unpaid parental leave, 
the least generous program among the OECD countries (Jaumotte 2003).
Under this corporate-driven welfare system, the U.S. gender gap in em-
ployment is just 15%, similar to that in the UK. Unlike the UK, however, 
U.S. women’s part-time employment as a share of women’s total employ-
ment has been steadily declining since the mid 1960s and is just 12% of all 
U.S. female employment.22 The freer rein of market mechanisms also yields 
greater income inequality more generally in the United States compared with 
Australia, being more similar to the UK’s along with a similar gender wage 
ratio of 78%.23
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So with their divergent policy profiles, the three countries have different 
equality structures than a simple liberal regime label suggests. Australia cod-
ified men’s privileged access to high-wage work, whereas the UK reinforced 
women’s domestic responsibility. Under greater adherence to liberal prin-
ciples, U.S. policy intervened less to restrict women’s access to paid work, 
and a woman’s normative responsibility for the domestic sphere is neither 
reinforced nor alleviated.
liberal divisions of household work
I use data from the 2002 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) to ex-
plore whether the more subtle policy differences across the three liberal re-
gimes yield divergent divisions of housework as found by Fuwa (2004) and 
Hook (2006) across widely differing societies. The 2002 ISSP module is the 
third on family and changing gender roles, but the first to include respon-
dents’ estimates of each partner’s weekly housework hours (excluding child 
care). From the 2002 ISSP, I select cohabiting or married couples where 
the respondent is younger than 60 years of age to look at differences in the 
household division of labor across countries and income brackets.
Table 4.1 displays partnered women’s employment participation. More 
U.S. partnered women are employed full-time than in the other two coun-
tries, whereas more Australian women are out of the labor force. Among 
partnered women who are employed, 34% in the United States, 44% in 
Britain, and more than half in Australia work part-time.24
Men’s and women’s average housework hours at different levels of wom-
en’s employment are displayed in Figure 4.1. Men and women in the UK 
and the United States spend about the same amount of time on housework, 
whereas Australian women and men each spend appreciably more than their 
counterparts in the other countries. Apart from these differences, trends 
across the countries are similar. Men’s average housework hours do not 
vary significantly with women’s employment, although women across the 
countries reduce their housework hours to a similar degree as their employ-
ment hours increase.25 A British or U.S. woman working full-time spends, 
ta b l e  4 . 1
Women’s employment in Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States
Country Full-time, % Part-time, % Out of Labor Force, %
Australia 22 23 55
United Kingdom 34 27 39
United States 40 21 39
s o u rc e :  Calculated from 2002 ISSP data on married or cohabiting couples, where respondent is 
younger than 60 years of age.
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on average, 10 fewer hours per week on housework than a housewife. An 
Australian woman working full-time spends about 12 fewer hours, but still 
devotes 5 more weekly hours to housework compared with her British and 
U.S. employed counterparts.
If men do not increase housework hours to compensate for the reduc-
tion in women’s housework as they increase their employment hours, this 
suggests dual-earner couples either forgo some domestic production (i.e., 
tolerate dirtier homes) and/or purchase more services on the market for 
it.26 Market provision includes hiring domestic personnel, or purchasing 
time-saving appliances, laundry services, restaurant or pre-packaged meals, 
and so on. If this is the case, greater equality in men’s relative share (but not 
hours of housework) is made possible with the household’s reliance on out-
side labor to produce domestic goods historically fashioned with women’s 
hourly input. This depicts a shift between hours in paid and unpaid labor oc-
curring at macro as well as micro levels, which together form what Glucks-
mann (1995) has referred to as the “total social organisation of labour.”
Any macrosocial organization of labor necessarily reflects the labor reg-
ulations and policies affecting not only women’s, but men’s, access to paid 
work. For example, the strength of the Australian working class movement 
that led to the Harvester Judgement and to greater gender employment in-
equality also resulted in skilled workers winning an 8-hour workday during 
a time when British and U.S. workers were attempting to win a 10-hour 
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Figure 4.1. Women’s and men’s housework hours at different levels of women’s 
employment for couples in Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States for 
2002.
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day (Sutcliffe 1967). The greater time Australian men and women spend 
in housework might thus reflect fewer hours spent in paid work. With the 
higher Australian wages, however, services would be more expensive. As a 
result, the poorest Australian households might not be able to afford mar-
ket-produced domesticity, whereas higher income households might require 
more time in paid work to purchase services compared with similar families 
in the UK and the United States. So although men’s housework hours vary 
little across partners’ employment status, how the household organizes the 
total of its paid and unpaid labor should vary substantially across the coun-
tries and across social classes within the countries.
I map these simultaneous dynamics in Figure 4.2, which displays part-
nered women’s and men’s average employment and housework hours across 
income quartiles within each country. The ISSP only surveys a single respon-
dent within a household, so these are not couple reports, but estimates as 
reported by individual women and men for themselves and their partner. 
See Chapter 11 (Geist, this volume) on international differences in what he 
says versus what she says are the hours each spend in housework. Nota-
bly, the nature of poverty appears different in Australia, because women’s 
and men’s employment hours among couples in the lowest income quartile 
are miniscule compared with the UK or the United States. This suggests 
that the poorest Australian families rely more heavily on state transfers, 
whereas the poorest British and U.S. families are the working poor, with U.S. 
wives’ greater employment hours not necessarily ensuring the couple escapes 
Figure 4.2. His and hers average weekly employment and housework hours by 
income quartile; ISSP 2002; and Australian, British (United Kingdom), and U.S. 
(United States) couples
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relative poverty. Among the poorest first quartile of Australian households, 
men and women devote appreciably more hours to housework, but their 
combined household time in employment and housework is significantly less 
than the poorest British or U.S. households. Not surprisingly, the moderately 
poor (second quartile) in all three countries achieve this greater economic se-
curity when women and men spend more hours in paid work and, perhaps, 
slightly less time in housework.
The relative time in paid and unpaid work across the countries reverses 
among upper income households. Some couples in the UK and the United 
States work smarter, but not harder; the total household time in employment 
and housework among British couples in the third income quartile and U.S. 
couples in the fourth is not appreciably greater than for second-quartile 
income couples in those countries. In contrast, Australian women and men 
spend more hours in paid work as well as housework as their household 
income increases. Consequently, those policies proclaimed a boon for work-
ing class Australian men during the 19th century might prove to be a bust 
for dual-earner couples in the 21st.
conclusion
As this book attests, there is increasing interest in how couples in different 
countries negotiate the division of housework when women are employed. 
Comparisons across socialist, former socialist, and more advanced industrial 
economies have revealed variation in men’s hours or share of housework, 
and some variation in the effects of women’s relative resources on shifting 
this division further (Fuwa 2004; Hook 2006), but comparisons across more 
similar countries have found no significant differences (Baxter 1997; Kalle-
berg and Rosenfeld 1990). Here I detailed how a broad range of policies 
affects the household division of labor, comparing the similar country cases 
of Australia, Great Britain, and the United States. These three countries 
share a common political heritage and ideological adherence to minimal 
state interference in citizens’ private lives, but vary more markedly in how 
policy has reinforced men’s preferential access to employment (Australia), 
promoted women’s responsibility for unpaid work of the domestic sphere 
(United Kingdom), or adhered to liberal tenets of minimal state interference 
in either (United States).
I found very little variation in men’s housework hours across the coun-
tries regardless of their partners’ employment, but greater variation in the 
total household organization of labor, which highlights further equality di-
lemmas. In all three countries, more equitable housework divisions among 
upper income couples derive in part from a reduction in total housework 
hours, undoubtedly in part by purchasing domestic services in the market. 
Service sector jobs producing domesticity tend to be more poorly paid and/or 
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part-time such that gender equity among the upper classes is made possible 
by class and wage inequality. The hierarchical relations remain gendered as 
well, as women dominate part-time and lower wage work. In Australia, early 
class gains leveraged against female employment, and subsequent compara-
ble worth policies that kept average wages higher extracted costs at each end 
of the income continuum. Lower income couples cannot afford to purchase 
domestic services and spend a greater number of hours performing the tasks 
themselves, likely leading to greater work–family conflict among the work-
ing poor. Australian couples in the higher income brackets spend more total 
hours in paid employment and housework than couples in the other two 
countries, suggesting greater time poverty at the upper end of the income 
range. The data used here do not include time spent in child care, which we 
can assume only increases the time or financial pressures on families.
In weighing the relative equality effects of different policy approaches to 
the household division of labor, restricting access to paid employment in a 
market-based economy yields the most extreme penalties within and across 
households. In contrast, policy reinforcement of women’s responsibility for 
the domestic sphere as in the United Kingdom still allows women the agency 
to reduce their domestic commitments.27 Today, governments express little 
concern over untidy houses, but a great deal of concern over declining birth 
rates, because this affects future economic growth. Together, results indicate 
that policy planning needs to be more holistic than has been the case to date, 
with greater awareness of policy linkages among gender equality, financial 
poverty, time poverty, and family outcomes.
notes
1. These theories include exchange dynamics depicted in Blau (1960) and 
Blood and Wolfe’s (1960) seminal works, and the work of neoclassical economist 
Becker (1981), who modeled couple life as a market exchange.
2. Detailing these dynamics requires that each partner’s actual housework 
hours are compared over time, not just the relative share. The articles by Bianchi 
et al. (2000) and Sayer (2005) detail this for the U.S. case, whereas Hook (2006) 
looks at changes in men’s hours across time and countries. In all cases, there has 
been a modest increase in men’s housework hours, but a larger decrease in wom-
en’s. Across time, child care hours have increased for both women and men, but 
the gender gap is even larger.
3. There is ample U.S. cross-sectional evidence of the persistent gendered 
division of housework, summarized by Shelton and John (1996). Gupta (1999) 
and South and Spitze (1994) used U.S. longitudinal data to illustrate how each 
gender’s share changes with their partnering status.
4. See Baxter (1997), who compared Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, 
and the United States; and Kalleberg and Rosenfeld (1990), who compared Can-
ada, Norway, Sweden, and the United States.
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5. Hook (2006), however, concludes this evidence does not support bar-
gaining dynamics as suggested by Breen and Cooke (2005), although her data 
precluded assessing them because they are collected on individuals but not their 
partners. I discuss these competing conclusions in more detail (Cooke 2007a).
6. In Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen (1990) con-
trasts welfare states along three dimensions. The first is state–market relations, 
reflecting the welfare mix of private and state provision; the second is the degree 
to which the state grants social rights equal status with property rights; and the 
third dimension is the degree to which the state reinforces existing hierarchies. 
From this classification, he argues there are three regime types: liberal regimes 
that rely on the market for individual welfare, corporatist–conservative ones 
that provide more universal provisions but maintain status hierarchies (including 
gendered ones), and social–democratic regimes that share a policy goal of greater 
equality and solidarity through more universal provisions.
7. I first discuss and diagram some of these proposed effects in Cooke (2007b) 
and expand upon them in Cooke (2007a), but since writing those articles, I have 
increased my emphasis on how policy and other institutional effects reinforce 
women’s domestic responsibility, regardless of the support for public equality.
8. This is an old debate—how much a gendered division of labor reflects 
women’s individual choice, a perspective in the fore in the work of Becker (1981) 
or Hakim (2000), versus the degree to which her choices are socially constructed 
in part by state policies, the argument applied here and also assessed more di-
rectly in Cooke (2006).
9. Gornick, Meyers, and Ross (1997) as well as Buchmann and Charles 
(1995) detail these different school effects across several industrialized countries, 
and the effect of such policies on mothers’ employment (Gornick, Meyers, and 
Ross 1998).
10. The volume edited by Wikander, Kessler-Harris, and Lewis (1995) dis-
cusses the history of protective legislation in Australia, Europe, and the United 
States.
11. Daly and Rake (2003) use Luxembourg Income Study data to illustrate 
that transfers in Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany result in the income in fe-
male-headed households being 90% of male-headed household income compared 
with just more than 70% in the United Kingdom and the United States.
12. Using the National Survey of Families and Households, I found U.S. 
women’s transfer income and employment earnings each predict husbands’ share 
of housework (Cooke 2007b).
13. See Phipps and Burton (1995) on the relative levels in Australia, Canada, 
the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States as of the 
mid 1980s.
14. Canada is also classified among the liberal regimes, but the analyses here 
are part of a larger research project that excludes Canada, because that country’s 
panel dataset excludes questions on domestic labor.
15. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of women in the Australian, 
state see Baldock and Cass (1988) or Ryan and Conlon (1989).
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16. The early U.S. legislation was updated in 1984 and followed in 1988 by 
the Family Support Act, whereas collection became coordinated across state lines 
in the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act.
17. In Cooke (2007b), I discuss the progression of child support enforcement 
in the United States, as well as the effects of more effective enforcement on the 
division of housework.
18. These figures are compiled from the Organisation for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD) Employment Outlook (OECD 2002, Tables 2.1, 
2.5, and 2.15), OECD Education at a Glance (2004), and annual data published 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2005).
19. Dex and Shaw (1986) argued that Britain’s employer tax policies also 
encouraged the growth in employer’s preference for offering part-time jobs com-
pared with the United States, where two part-time employees are more costly 
than a single full-time one.
20. See Sklar (1993) and Skocpol (1992) for an overview of the dynamics 
among gender and class during this period, and Mink (1986) for discussions of 
gender, class, and race.
21. EEOC v. Steak ’n Shake Operations, Inc. No. 4:04CV00880 SNL (E.D. 
Mo. June 22, 2006).
22. See Drobnicˇ, Blossfeld, and Rohwer (1999); and Kalleberg, Reskin, and 
Hudson (2000).
23. For income inequality at different points in time, see the Luxembourg 
Income Study website (www.lisproject.org/keyfigures/ineqtable.htm).
24. These percentages are calculated as follows: percent part-time ÷ (percent 
full-time + percent part-time). They contrast somewhat with the OECD statistics 
for all women age 15 to 64 years, because the ISSP sample is comprised of only 
partnered women younger than 60.
25. The visual differences were confirmed statistically regressing men’s and 
women’s housework hours on the respondent’s age, number of children, religion, 
education, and household income. After including an indicator variable for the 
United Kingdom and one for Australia (referent = United States), the Australian 
indicator variable was positive and significant for both genders, but women’s em-
ployment intensity did not predict any significant shift in men’s housework hours, 
only women’s. Interaction terms for country ¥ wife’s employment were also not 
significant, so effects are consistent across countries.
26. See de Ruijter, Treas, and Cohen (2005) for evidence on outsourcing in 
the U.S. case.
27. Lundberg and Pollak (1994) suggest a similar solution at the couple level 
in their noncooperative bargaining models (i.e., when left with the entire domestic 
burden, women reduce it to a level that is manageable on their own).
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